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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of international arbitration as an alternative to litigation in
national courts has increased rapidly over the past three decades.1 This has
occurred in part because of the recent precipitate growth in foreign direct
investment.2 As a dispute resolution mechanism based on mutual consent,
international arbitration must be attractive to both governmental and private
parties in order to provide an advantage over other methods of dispute
resolution, thereby encouraging parties to arbitrate their disputes.
The advantages of international arbitration generally include quicker
resolution of disputes, lower costs than traditional litigation, avoidance of
potential “home field” bias for one of the parties, and confidentiality, among
many others.3 Allowing parties to settle their disputes in a manner
predetermined by contract is undoubtedly a positive development in a rapidly
globalizing world, especially when it results in increased certainty in the
dispute resolution process for all of the parties involved. While this process
is ideal, international arbitration suffers from a few serious problems that, if
not addressed, will hinder its future prospects as an efficient method of
dispute resolution.
In the process of seeking rapid finality, developments specific to
international investment arbitration have created two primary problems that
produce uncertainty. The first problem is the almost universal lack of a
genuine appellate process that would allow parties to appeal awards resulting
from the faulty legal reasoning of tribunals.4 Consequently, errant legal
rulings made by arbitrators are not subject to any meaningful form of judicial
review.5 Second, the lack of clear precedent creates additional uncertainty,
exacerbated by the problem that some arbitral agreements seem to be
intentionally drafted to avoid settled domestic law on certain contractual

1
Stavros Brekoulakis, International Arbitration: Basic Principles and Characteristics,
QFINANCE 1, 2 (2011), http://www.qfinance.com/contentFiles/QF02/g1xtn5q6/12/2/internatio
nal-arbitration-basic-principles-and-characteristics.pdf.
2
Christopher M. Ryan, Discerning the Compliance Calculus: Why States Comply with
International Investment Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 63, 64 (2009).
3
Peter Sherwin et al., The Decision to Arbitrate, in PROSKAUER ON INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: MANAGING, RESOLVING, AND AVOIDING CROSS-BORDER
BUSINESS OR REGULATORY DISPUTES (Jennifer R. Scullion et al. eds., 2011), available at
http://www.proskauerguide.com/arbitration/19/I.
4
Erin E. Gleason, International Arbitral Appeals: What Are We So Afraid Of?, 7 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 269, 270–72 (2007).
5
See generally id. (arguing the legitimacy of international arbitration is threatened by the
absence of an arbitral appeals process). The ICSID annulment mechanism does not amount to
a form of judicial review in the sense that, under this process, the legal reasoning of arbitral
tribunals may not be reviewed. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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issues.6 While this latter problem is of greater concern in the commercial
and employment contexts,7 it does raise an important point about
international investment arbitration, namely, the role of precedent.
The lack of both appellate review and clear precedent creates uncertainty
in international investment arbitration. The former creates problems for the
parties involved in any specific dispute and the latter for the legal regime as a
whole. The importance of foreign direct investment to the global economy
cannot be underestimated, and in order to assure its continued role in the
international economy, these issues must be confronted.8 This Note will
address the importance of establishing a system of appellate review in
international investment arbitration, particularly at the International Centre
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is the leading
international arbitration institution for the settlement of investor-state
disputes.9 The ICSID currently uses an annulment mechanism in lieu of
providing an appellate option.10 This annulment procedure has arguably
increased uncertainty in international investment arbitration.11
Over the past few years, research on international investment arbitration
has developed considerably, particularly with regard to the ICSID.12 The
topics addressed have included the annulment mechanism at the ICSID, the
role of precedent in investment arbitration, and the problem of uncertainty in
the field. This body of research provides a foundation upon which this Note
seeks to build by considering a recent development in commercial
arbitration.
In order to improve understanding of the method by which an appellate
mechanism might work, this Note will consider an existing arbitral appellate
mechanism at a commercial arbitration organization as a template for an
appellate procedure at the ICSID. In contrast to an analysis of the appellate
6

Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 190 (2006).
Id.
8
For more substantive discussions on the importance of foreign direct investment in the
international economy, see, e.g., Robert D. Hormats, Under Sec’y for Econ., Energy & Agric.
Affairs, Remarks at the World Investment Forum: Importance of Investment in the Global
Economy (Sept. 6, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rm k/2010/146894.htm.
9
See Girard Gibbs LLP & Lazareff Le Bars AARPI, International Arbitration, http://
www.internationalarbitrationlaw.com/arbitration-courts/icsid (last visited Jan. 7, 2013)
[hereinafter International Arbitration] (noting that in the international context, investor-state
disputes generally involve a national government and at least one foreign investor).
10
See ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Part F, Ch. VII, Rules 50–55 (Apr. 10,
2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF-chap07.htm (outlining the
ICSID annulment procedure).
11
See generally Dohyun Kim, Note, The Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying
Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away from an Annulment-Based
System, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242 (2011) (arguing the ICSID’s annulment process has created an
additional layer of inconsistent decisions).
12
See discussion infra Parts II, III.
7
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mechanism previously considered by the ICSID in 2004,13 using an arbitral
appellate procedure that is already in existence will provide a more direct
insight into how an ICSID appellate mechanism might look and how it
would function best.
This Note will use the appeals rules for arbitration recently enacted at the
Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand, Inc. (AMINZ) as a
starting point for analyzing an appellate framework at the ICSID. The
appellate process at the AMINZ is only a few years old14 and while this Note
will provide some insight into it, an independent study of this mechanism is
beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead, the AMINZ appellate system will
be used to shed light on possible reform of the process at the ICSID. Beyond
providing a basic background of the AMINZ, it is only within the context of
the ICSID procedure that the AMINZ will be evaluated, and any claims
made herein should be taken in that light.
Using the AMINZ appellate rules as a framework for an ICSID appellate
procedure will help not only to illustrate how to effectively implement such
reforms, but will also assist in evaluating potential problems that such a
mechanism might encounter and how to address those issues effectively.
Because international commercial and investment arbitration vary to a degree
in both their goals and procedures, using an actual appellate process as a
framework illustrates the manner in which appeals of investor-state tribunal
awards might vary from the commercial arbitration setting. It is the
objective of this Note to provide such insight and to act as a basis for further
research into the topic as the necessity for an appellate procedure at the
ICSID is likely to grow in the coming years.
Critically, the appellate mechanism proposed in this Note will address the
two major shortcomings of the current ICSID annulment procedure. First, it
will remedy the genuine lack of an appellate process at the ICSID. With a
new appellate mechanism, parties will be able to appeal awards based on
legal grounds, thus remedying parties’ concerns that an award will be issued
against them that is not subject to appeal, regardless of how errant the
tribunal’s legal reasoning might have been.
Second, the proposed
mechanism will increase certainty in international investment law as the
appellate tribunals establish a clearer body of precedent.15 By settling legal
13
ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration 19–26
(ICSID, Discussion Paper, Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontS
ervlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnnouncePDF&AnnouncementTy
pe=archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.pdf.
14
AMINZ Arbitration Appeal Tribunal, BUILDING DISPUTES TRIBUNAL (2010), http://www.bu
ildingdisputestribunal.co.nz/ARBITRATION/AMINZ+ARBITRATION+APPEAL+TRIBUNA
L.html.
15
While the precedential value of such holdings might weigh more heavily with ICSID
arbitral tribunals than with external tribunals, there is no reason to believe the precedential
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inconsistencies rendered by arbitral tribunals, parties will be able to make
future decisions with a better understanding of the possible legal
ramifications of their actions.
Part II presents background material on the ICSID.
First, the
organization’s general characteristics are discussed. Second, an evaluation
of the current annulment mechanism and its insufficiency in light of the
current needs of international investment law are provided. Third, current
proposals for reform of the ICSID’s review procedure are presented,
including the reasons such proposals fall short of accomplishing their
intended goals.
Part III provides a general background of developments in international
commercial arbitration, with particular attention given to procedures for
appeal of awards. Part IV presents a closer look at the AMINZ, and the
defining characteristics of its recently enacted appellate mechanism. Part V
provides an analysis of how the AMINZ appellate mechanism could be
successfully mapped onto the ICSID system. Key issues analyzed include
the confidentiality of proceedings, the extent to which the new mechanism
would replace the current annulment mechanism, the categories of issues that
would be subject to appeal, the manner in which the appellate mechanism
would structurally operate, and how the critical procedural rules would
function. Lastly, Part VI concludes the Note.
II. THE ICSID AND APPEAL OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
A. The ICSID: Past and Present
The ICSID was created after the ICSID Convention, a multilateral treaty
promulgated by the World Bank, entered into force in late 1966.16 The
primary purpose for creating the ICSID was to facilitate the arbitration and
conciliation of international investment disputes.17 Today, it accomplishes
this in three ways.18 First, the ICSID Convention itself and the Regulations
and Rules promulgated by the ICSID Administrative Council “provide[ ] the
impact would be limited to ICSID proceedings. Indeed, the presence of this new corrective
procedural mechanism would probably have the effect of increasing the general precedential
value of ICSID awards since they would now have to withstand the scrutiny of genuine legal
review.
16
About ICSID, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&page
Name=AboutICSID_Home (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
17
Id.
18
ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=RightFrame&FromPage=Dispute%20Settlement%20Facilities&pageName=Disp_sett
l_facilities (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
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basic procedural framework for conciliation and arbitration of investment
disputes arising between member countries and investors that qualify as
nationals of other member countries.”19 Second, the Additional Facility
Rules adopted in 1978 “authoriz[e] the ICSID Secretariat to administer
certain types of proceedings between States and foreign nationals which fall
outside the scope of the [ICSID] Convention.”20 Lastly, the ICSID may
administer proceedings under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules21 and
appoint arbitrators in the event two parties authorize the ICSID to do so.22
Since 1994, the annual number of cases registered by the ICSID has risen
steadily, until 2003 when the number of cases filed increased rapidly.23 Over
half the cases filed in the institution’s thirty-nine year history have been filed
since 2003.24 With 158 signatory States, of which 147 have also deposited
ratification,25 the ICSID is considered the leading international arbitration
institution for investor-state disputes.26
B. The ICSID Annulment Mechanism
The recent increase in cases filed at the ICSID has raised important
questions about the effectiveness of the institution’s procedural rules.27 One
of the procedural tools that has attracted much criticism over the past several
years from both parties involved in proceedings at the ICSID and experts in
the field is the annulment mechanism.28
19

Id.
Id.
21
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is the principal
international trade law organization at the United Nations. The body’s goal is the promotion of
modernization and harmonization of international business rules.
About UNCITRAL,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). The
UNCITRAL has promulgated its own model arbitration rules that are often used in alternative
dispute resolution. 2010 — UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.or
g/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013). For
more information about the UNCITRAL, see generally UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/un
citral/en/index.html.
22
ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities, supra note 18.
23
ICSID, The ICSID Caseload - Statistics 7 (2011), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/I
CSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatisti
cs=True&language=English32.
24
Id.
25
Member States, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?RequestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pag
eName=MemberStates_Home (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
26
About ICSID, supra note 16; International Arbitration, supra note 9.
27
Johanna Kalb, Comment, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 179, 181 (2005).
28
See, e.g., Claire Stockford, Appeal Versus Annulment: Is the ICSID Annulment Process
Working or Is It Now Time for an Appellate Mechanism? (2011), http://www.crowell.com/files/I
20
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Under the ICSID’s procedural rules, awards may only be annulled on five
grounds: (1) “the Tribunal was not properly constituted,” (2) the Tribunal
“manifestly exceeded its powers,” (3) one of the arbitrators was corrupt, (4)
there was “a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure,” and
(5) “the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.”29 When it
was originally established, the ICSID’s annulment mechanism was a boon to
investor-state arbitration because it helped avoid the “pitfalls of national
legal systems” from which international commercial arbitration often
suffers.30 Indeed, it was one of the unique elements that originally
contributed to the Convention’s success.31 More recently, however, as
annulment committees have continued to issue more annulment decisions, it
has become clear that they have often annulled awards based on legal rather
than procedural grounds.32 In these specific cases, this action effectively
turns the annulment process into a de facto appellate procedure capable of
reviewing the legal holdings of the original tribunals.
In contrast, a relatively recent annulment decision, CMS v. Argentina
illustrates the opposing dilemma for the ICSID annulment process.33 In that
case, the annulment committee refused to strike an award although it
acknowledged the faulty legal reasoning of the original tribunal.34 Despite
the fact that the annulment committee made the correct decision by holding
that it could not annul an award due to an error of legal reasoning, Argentina,
nevertheless, refused to honor the award.35
In part due to these two opposing dilemmas, many parties and experts
have called for a reform of the annulment system, and even its replacement
with a genuine mechanism for appellate review.36 Although these problems
s-the-ICSID-Annulment-Process-Working-or-is-it-Now-Time-for-an-Appellate-Mechan ism.pdf;
Kim, supra note 11; see also Yale Journal of International Law’s 2012 ICSID Conference,
FOREIGN & INT’L BLOG (Nov. 2, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://library.law.yale.edu/blogs/foreign-intern
ational-blog/2012/02/09/yale-journal-international-laws-2012-icsid-conference.
29
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 66(1), Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention], available at http://icsid.worldb ank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-fin
al.pdf.
30
Hans Van Houtte, Article 52 of the Washington Convention: A Brief Introduction, in
ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS 11, 11 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2004).
31
Id.
32
Thomas W. Wälde, ICSID ‘Annulment Committee,’ TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Feb. 2004,
at 24.
33
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision
on Annulment, ¶ 136 (Sept. 25, 2007), 14 ICSID Rep. 251, 275–76 (2009).
34
Id.
35
Luke E. Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still Wait for
a Payout, LAW.COM (June 25, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.
jsp?id=1202431736731&slreturn=20130009204331.
36
See infra Part II.C.
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alone are substantial enough to cast doubt on the annulment mechanism,
another concern has surfaced more recently that is likely to become more
exacerbated over time.
As more annulment committees have been convened and more decisions
released, it has become clear that these holdings have added yet another layer
of inconsistency to the decisions of the original arbitral tribunals.37 Given
the judicialization that investor-state arbitration at the ICSID is currently
undergoing,38 this pattern of inconsistent annulment decisions could threaten
the future legitimacy of the ICSID system.39 Consequently, calls for reform
or replacement of the annulment system have increased over the past several
years.
Concern about inconsistent decisions has become especially pertinent as
the issue of precedent in investment arbitration has arisen. Although no strict
doctrine of precedent in international investment arbitration exists, research
has demonstrated that prior published awards often impact how future
arbitral tribunals rule.40 Inconsistent decisions, at both the initial arbitration
and the annulment stage, undoubtedly produce much uncertainty for parties
arbitrating investment disputes.41 While the argument that finality is more
important to parties than certainty does merit some consideration, especially
as investors continue to win awards at a high frequency,42 it is unlikely that
an investment dispute resolution mechanism based solely on finality will
continue indefinitely at the expense of accuracy and certainty.43 This
becomes especially true where the losing party is likely to suffer significant

37

Kim, supra note 11, at 246.
Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW &
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 47, 59–60 (2010).
39
Kim, supra note 11, at 246.
40
See generally Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1031 (2007) (noting arbitral tribunals tend to identify relevant
prior decisions, compare the cost of departing from and adhering to precedent, decide whether
to follow or depart from prior decisions, and then explain their choice).
41
The SGS cases (SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Iran
and SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines) are one
example of inconsistent decisions made at the ICSID. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy
Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through
Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1569 (2005) (“In the SGS cases, one
ICSID tribunal held that the ‘umbrella clause’ cannot transform a failure to pay fees under a
concession contract into a treaty breach, while another ICSID tribunal came to the opposite
conclusion.”). See generally Gabriel Egli, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent
Application of Most-Favored Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L.
REV. 1045, 1064–78 (2007) (discussing the inconsistent ICSID holdings on Most-Favored
Nation Clauses).
42
Thomas W. Walsh, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy
Sufficient to Compromise Finality?, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 444, 445 (2006).
43
See Franck, supra note 41, at 1548.
38
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monetary damages. While member states often advance the interests of
investors,44 it is unlikely they will continue to do so in the face of increasing
uncertainty.
Countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela, which have left the
ICSID convention, and Nicaragua, which has threatened to do so, argue that
the ICSID process fails to produce fair results.45 General distrust of foreign
investors aside, the fact that several ostensibly erroneous awards have been
rendered by the ICSID bolsters their arguments. Additionally, the fact that
these countries have been sued frequently by investors probably influenced
their decision to withdraw. Because damages can sometimes run into the
billions and even tens of billions of dollars and potentially erroneous and
inconsistent holdings are not subject to review, many countries are hesitant
to place themselves on the hook on an ongoing basis.
C. Proposals for Reform of Review of Awards at the ICSID
In 2004, due to the increasing awareness and concern about the
deficiencies of the ICSID annulment system, the ICSID Secretariat included
in a discussion paper the possible need for appellate review and even
proposed how such a system might operate.46 In the publication the
Secretariat cited the increasing number of investment treaties that include
provisions for appellate review47 and the need “to foster coherence and
consistency in the case law emerging under investment treaties.”48 Since this
time, however, the ICSID has not moved forward with any plans to
implement an appellate mechanism.
A variety of models have been proposed for a system of appellate review
at the ICSID. One proposal posits that a permanent appellate body should be
established to rule on all investment treaty matters regardless of whether the
original procedure was carried out at the ICSID.49 This approach would be
difficult because, in addition to requiring the consent of all the member states
44

Omar E. García-Bolívar, The Teleology of International Investment Law: The Role of
Purpose in the Interpretation of International Investment Agreements, 6 J. WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 751, 751 (2005).
45
See Joshua M. Robbins, Ecuador Withdraws from ICSID Convention, PRACTICAL LAW CO.
(Aug. 12, 2009), http://arbitration.practicallaw.com/2-422-1266; John L. Gardiner et al.,
Nicaragua Threatens Withdrawal from ICSID: Implications for Investors, SKADDEN (Apr. 24,
2008), https://sasmf.com/content/Publications/Publications1391_0.pdf; Press Release, ICSID,
Venezuela Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (Jan. 26, 2012), https://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageT
ype=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement100.
46
ICSID Secretariat, supra note 13, at 14–16, annex 1–5.
47
Id. at 14, para. 20.
48
Id. at 14–15, para. 21.
49
Franck, supra note 41, at 1524.
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to amend the ICSID Convention to make awards appealable,50 it would also
require separate consent to make awards rendered under all other investment
treaty dispute settlement institutions subject to review by the new appellate
body.
The procedural difficulties of enacting such an appellate body cannot be
underestimated. Doing so would require the consent and agreement of all
state members of the international investment community. Where such
consensus could not be achieved, the new appellate body—charged with the
task of fostering consistency in international investment arbitral awards—
would quickly find the reach of its decisions placed into question. This
would likely be the case where some members of a multilateral investment
treaty (MIT) or free trade agreement ratified the new appellate body while
others did not. The new appellate body’s authority and credibility would
essentially come to rely entirely upon the universal agreement of all states
that are part of the international investment community to subject all of their
investment agreements and disputes to the new appellate mechanism.
Establishing such a mechanism from scratch would be all but impossible in
the complicated system of investment treaties and free trade agreements
already in place, with the catch being that if universal consent could not be
achieved, the new mechanism would lose its most attractive feature–its
universality.
Another proposed solution has been the independent creation of appellate
bodies for each individual investment treaty.51 This possibility would,
however, lead to further fragmentation in investment dispute resolution,52
and as such, is unlikely to be a favorable model. Because the number of
investment treaties is almost certain to continue to rise, such an appellate
process would produce a system of progressively increasing fragmentation.
Under such a system, several potential problems could arise. First, the
individual mechanisms themselves would undoubtedly vary from treaty to
treaty, resulting in disparate legal holdings. This would become especially
problematic where principles of international law are at issue because one of
the goals of such a system would be to create consistency and certainty rather
than forum-by-forum variation. Additionally, because each appellate body
would undoubtedly operate differently,53 the legitimacy and stability of each
institution could vary. Consequently, since increasing consistency and
uniformity (and thereby certainty) is a major goal of establishing an appellate
50

ICSID Convention, supra note 29, art. 66(1).
Kim, supra note 11, at 276.
52
ICSID Secretariat, supra note 13, at 15–16, para. 23.
53
For example, some might provide for the creation of ad hoc arbitral tribunals, while
others might have a permanent appellate tribunal, and still others might be composed of
members of national courts or bureaucracies.
51
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mechanism for international investment arbitration, a treaty-by-treaty
approach would be ineffective.
Another proposal would involve the establishment of a body similar to
the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC).54 While this is not an appellate
mechanism per se, it would be able to provide a check on inconsistent
rulings.55 Interpretations by the NAFTA FTC are binding on all future
arbitrations under NAFTA, thus such a mechanism should be able to correct
inconsistencies in tribunal decisions and altogether eliminate current
annulment inconsistencies.56
There has been concern, however, that bodies like the NAFTA FTC,
which are comprised of domestic bureaucrats, often make self-serving
decisions that threaten the legitimacy of the institution.57 Additionally, these
bodies would almost certainly have to be established at the treaty level, since
having ministers from each sovereign party to the treaty is important in
helping establish the legitimacy of binding interpretations. If such a system
were enacted at a larger level, the increased number of sovereigns
represented would almost certainly make the process too cumbersome to be
of any use. Implementing something like the NAFTA FTC on a larger scale
could raise concerns among states that their limited representation might
result in problems regarding the level of consensus required for a binding
interpretation. Additionally, there could be concerns among states that
sovereigns with greater influence might have greater sway on a system that
would necessarily bind them as well. Many states would likely object on this
basis.
Since this proposal would have to be enacted at the treaty level, it would
encounter many of the same issues as establishing an actual appellate body
for each treaty, including legitimacy and inconsistency problems. Such a
mechanism would not, therefore, be useful in achieving greater consistency
and certainty in the interpretation of international investment law.
Despite all that has been written over the past several years about the
faults of the current annulment mechanism and the need for a system of
appellate procedure, to date, the ICSID has not instituted any reforms to this
critical aspect of its procedure. While this is due at least in part to the
difficulty of gaining the necessary consensus for such reform, current
concerns are unlikely to subside and will probably increase as tribunals and
annulment committees continue to issue inconsistent awards and annulment
rulings. Consequently, the effort to establish an appellate mechanism at the
ICSID is now more important than ever.
54
55
56
57

Kim, supra note 11, at 277.
Id.
Franck, supra note 41, at 1604.
Id. at 1604–05.
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III. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
Commercial arbitration, which in contrast to investor-state arbitration
usually involves two private parties, has stumbled upon similar problems,
albeit without the annulment mechanism that makes procedure at the ICSID
so unique. Generally, the only recourse parties have to a disagreeable
commercial arbitral decision is to appeal to the national courts at the site of
the arbitration.58 This nation-based system of review for international
arbitral awards has produced a wide variation in parties’ rights depending
upon where the seat of arbitration is located.59 Countries such as the United
States, Great Britain, and China have not allowed a strict appeal of
international arbitration awards,60 at least not based on faulty legal reasoning.
This line of thought holds that parties assume this risk when they enter into
the arbitration agreement. In contrast, countries such as Austria and South
Africa do allow “for appellate review of international commercial awards.”61
Consequently, such widely varying results have made the determination of
where the parties agree to hold the arbitration one of the most important
decisions in drafting an international arbitration agreement.
Appeals of domestic commercial arbitration awards have, however, been
permitted in several countries. Among them is the United States, where in
2000 the Center for Public Resources (CPR) Institute for Dispute Resolution
was the “first major private commercial arbitration institution to establish
separate, optional rules governing appeals procedures.”62 Since then, other
arbitration institutions have established appellate procedures, including the
AMINZ.63 This development in commercial arbitration is important not only
for the ongoing effects it has on commercial arbitration, but also because of
the example it provides for the related, but distinct, field of investment
arbitration.

58

Gleason, supra note 4, at 287.
See id. (noting the lack of uniformity in standards and methods applied by national courts).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration:
Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 555 (2000); CPR
Arbitration Appeal Procedure and Commentary, CPR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION (2007), http://cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/t
abid/265/ID/604/CPR-Arbitration-Appeal-Procedure-and-Commentary.aspx.
63
AMINZ Arbitration Appeal Rules, AMINZ COUNCIL (May 27, 2009), http://www.aminz.or
g.nz/Category?Action=View&Category_id=173 [hereinafter AMINZ Appeal Rules].
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IV. THE ARBITRATORS’ AND MEDIATORS’ INSTITUTE OF NEW ZEALAND
The AMINZ is the largest professional organization for dispute resolution
in New Zealand.64 Having begun as a Branch of the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators (UK) in the 1970s, the organization incorporated as the
Arbitrators’ Institute of New Zealand in 1987.65 Due to mergers with two
other dispute resolution institutions, the institute was renamed as the
Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand in 1996.66 The
organization currently provides services in several areas of dispute resolution
including: arbitration, mediation, negotiation, facilitation, conciliation,
investigation, expert determination, and adjudication.67
In 2009, the AMINZ enacted an arbitration appellate mechanism.68 The
Appeals Rules state their purpose “is to encourage, . . . the efficient,
confidential and high-quality resolution of appeals from arbitral awards on
questions of law.”69 The appellate system at the AMINZ was created
primarily to address concerns over the confidentiality of dispute resolution
proceedings.70 Prior to the enactment of the Appeals Rules, appeals were
sent to the High Court of New Zealand.71 In effect, this would take
proceedings that were confidential at the AMINZ and result in their
disclosure as soon as they entered the public court system.72 The AMINZ
appellate mechanism was designed to correct this problem.
The AMINZ appellate procedure has many important features. Because
its framework will be analyzed in reference to the manner in which an
appellate mechanism at the ICSID could successfully function, it is important
to become familiar with several of the defining factors of the AMINZ
appellate structure.
As a starting point, filing an appeal within the AMINZ is provided as an
alternative to appealing to the High Court of New Zealand.73 For the
64

AMINZ, http://www.aminz.org.nz/MainMenu (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
About Us: Overview, AMINZ, http://www.aminz.org.nz/Category?Action=View&Categ
ory_id=44 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
66
Id.
67
Dispute Resolution Processes, AMINZ, http://www.aminz.org.nz/Category?Action=Vie
w&Category_id=90 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
68
AMINZ Appeal Rules, supra note 63.
69
Id. art. 1.1.
70
Arbitration Appeals Tribunal, AMINZ, http://www.aminz.org.nz/Category?Action=Vie
w&Category_id=172 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
71
AMINZ Arbitration Appeal Tribunal, supra note 14. The High Court of New Zealand is
not to be confused with the Supreme Court of New Zealand, which was formerly called the
Privy Council. The History of the Court System, THE COURTS OF NEW ZEALAND, http://www.
courtsofnz.govt.nz/front-page/about/system/history/overview (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
72
Id.
73
Arbitration Appeals Tribunal, supra note 70.
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Appeals Rules to apply, parties must agree to a right of appeal under the
Rules.74 Where there is such a right, parties are prohibited from taking any
legal action against the other party or parties regarding the issue “until the
time for filing an appeal has expired and no appeal has been filed or, if an
appeal has been filed, until such appeal has been . . .” resolved.75 However,
the rules explicitly allow legal action after the time for filing an appeal at the
AMINZ has expired, or after the Arbitration Appeal Tribunal (AAT) has
made its final award.76 Consequently, appeal within the AMINZ is optional,
and resort to the High Court is the default procedure unless otherwise
provided in the agreement to arbitrate.77 The appeal is available only where
the seat of arbitration has been either agreed to or found to be in New
Zealand.78
The Rules provide for the creation of three new bodies at the AMINZ: the
Arbitration Appeals Committee (AAC), the Arbitration Appeal Panel (AAP),
and the ad hoc Arbitration Appeal Tribunals (AATs). The AAC consists of
three qualified members appointed by the AMINZ Council (the Council)79
for renewable three-year terms.80 The AAP is the other permanent body, and
is comprised of former judges and other qualified arbitrators.81 Members of
the AAP act as a pool of candidates for the third new body, the AATs, which
are formed on an ad hoc basis.82
An appeal under the Rules is only available if it is based on a question of
law, which includes legal errors found in the original arbitration decision and
those errors that were not on the record.83 By limiting appeals to questions
of law, this notably excludes questions regarding the absence or insufficiency
of evidence upon which the decision was rendered, and questions regarding
interpretation and inferences drawn from facts.84 After the appellant files the
appeal, the respondent may file a notice of cross-appeal as long as it is within
the time provided for filing and notice of opposition to the appeal has been
74

AMINZ Appeal Rules, supra note 63, art. 4.2.
Id. art. 4.3.
76
Id. art. 4.4.
77
Clauses for Your Agreement: Supplemental Clause for Use by Parties Wishing to Invoke
the AMINZ Arbitration Appeals Rules, AMINZ, http://www.aminz.org.nz/Category?Action=
ViewCategory_id=512 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
78
AMINZ Appeal Rules, supra note 63, art. 3.3.
79
The Council is the AMINZ’s main administrative body. A president, vice president, and
five councillors comprise the Council. Council and Staff, AMINZ, http://www.aminz.org.nz/
Category?Action=View&Category_id=97 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
80
Schedule, The Constitution of the AMINZ Arbitration Appeals Committee, AMINZ, § A
(2008), http://www.aminz.org.nz/Category?Action=View&Category_id=434.
81
AMINZ Appeal Rules, supra note 63, art. 2.1.
82
Id. arts. 1.1., 2.1.
83
Id. art. 2.1.
84
Id.
75
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given, or if the AAT determines that a delay was warranted under the
circumstances.85
AATs are appointed on a case-by-case basis by the AAC and have either
one or three members.86 The AAC must take under consideration any
requests made by the parties regarding any qualifications the arbitrator(s)
require(s) and, in the event the parties are of different nationalities, the AAC
will consider appointing an arbitrator of a different nationality than either of
the parties.87 Moreover, the parties may decide among themselves who the
arbitrator(s) for the AAT will be, if the parties agree within five working
days after all respondents have filed a notice of opposition.88 In the absence
of party wishes to the contrary, the AAC will select a sole arbitrator to hear
the appeal.89 Although all AAT members will generally be selected from the
AAP, under exceptional circumstances, the AAC may select arbitrators who
are not members of the AAP.90
In the instance where one party seeks to bar an arbitrator from hearing an
appeal, the AAC shall rule on the challenge.91 In such a case, the AAC’s
ruling is not subject to appeal.92 An oral hearing may be dispensed with if
the parties agree, and the AAT may then make its decision based solely on
the filings.93
Rules regarding the award procedure are very important in any
arbitration, particularly where the arbitration is the final permitted appeal
(e.g. in New Zealand under the AMINZ), because the only other option
parties will have is the public court system. Unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, “the AAT shall state the reasons upon which its award is based.”94 In
the event that there are three arbitrators in disagreement on an issue, a
majority of two shall be determinative, and if no majority is present, the
Chairman of the AAT shall be the one to decide.95
Prior to issuing its award, the AAT may, using “its absolute discretion,”
require that all or part of the award issued by the original tribunal be paid to
the other party or placed in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal.96 The

85

Id. art. 5.4.
Id. art. 6.1.
87
Id. art. 6.2.
88
Id. art. 6.6.
89
Id. art. 6.8(c).
90
Id. art. 6.9. Such exceptional circumstances may relate to overseas appointments, but are
ultimately left to the discretion of the AAC.
91
Id. art. 7.6.
92
Id.
93
Id. art. 8.3.
94
Id. art. 9.1.
95
Id. art. 9.2.
96
Id. arts. 10.1, 10.1(a).
86

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

582

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

8/21/2013 2:42 PM

[Vol. 41:567

AAT may also require that any party comply with any other order that was
made in the original award.97
Where the parties have agreed to a right of appeal under the Appeals
Rules, the AAT is granted all the powers of the High Court of New Zealand,
except that the AAT may not remand the award to the original “tribunal
where that tribunal is unwilling or unable to accept the remission.”98 In the
event the original tribunal is unable or unwilling to accept the remand, the
AAT may at its discretion rule on the issue itself.99 Lastly, in the case of
withdrawal by the appellant of the original appeal, the respondent still has
the right to continue any cross-appeal(s) it has filed.100 The abovementioned
provisions of the Appeals Rules are the most crucial to understanding the
appellate procedure.
V. MAPPING THE AMINZ ARBITRAL APPELLATE RULES ONTO THE ICSID
SYSTEM
While the AMINZ appellate structure provides a solid basis for what an
actual, successful appellate mechanism at the ICSID might look like, there
are several questions to consider when applying the AMINZ rules to the
ICSID. First, what issues arise regarding confidentiality? Second, would the
new appellate mechanism replace the current system of annulment, and if so,
to what extent? Third, what issues would be subject to appeal? Fourth, how
would the appellate mechanism structurally function? And finally, how
would the mechanism’s critical procedural rules best operate? As this
analysis will show, the AMINZ appellate mechanism provides many useful
insights into these questions.
A. Confidentiality
The first major issue, confidentiality, is preliminary to the analysis of the
substantive appellate mechanism and is the fundamental reason the AMINZ
appellate rules were created.101 The ICSID appellate mechanism’s purpose,
however, would be entirely different from the goal of establishing a
confidential appellate procedure. Under the original AMINZ arbitral
procedure, an award was only subject to appeal to the High Court, where the
original arbitral proceeding would enter the public record and lose

97
98
99
100
101

Id. art. 10.1(b).
Id. art. 12.1.
Id.
Id. art. 13.2.
Arbitration Appeals Tribunal, supra note 70.
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confidentiality.102 The appellate system enacted by the AMINZ was
designed specifically to address this problem.103
In contrast, confidentiality is not one of the reasons an appellate
mechanism at the ICSID is necessary. The current method provides for an
annulment process within the ICSID structure, so whatever procedure for
confidentiality is provided for in the original arbitration can be preserved in
the annulment proceeding. However “[u]nlike international commercial
arbitrations between two private corporations, which are generally
confidential, investment treaty arbitrations are subject to lower levels of
confidentiality.”104
To be sure, confidentiality does play a role at the ICSID,105 albeit a lesser
one than in commercial arbitration. For one, ICSID Rule 48(4) provides that
even where the parties choose not to have the award published, the ICSID
will still include in its publications excerpts of the tribunal’s reasoning.106
Additionally, many ICSID awards and proceedings are made public pursuant
to the wishes of the parties and are easily accessed at the ICSID’s website.107
Publication of awards by the ICSID and its obligatory release of
tribunals’ reasoning, even in cases where one or both parties wish to keep the
proceedings confidential, further illustrate the precedential value of tribunal
awards. In addition to maintaining the transparency of the ICSID as an
organization, publication of awards also provides future guidance for parties
and arbitrators regarding past and current legal reasoning in international
investment law. The importance of disclosure in international investment
arbitration cannot be understated.
With disclosure comes public scrutiny. Because international
investment law, i.e., the principles and rules of public
international law relevant to foreign investments, is a rapidly
developing field, it was inevitable that arbitrators would
occasionally render contradictory awards. These conflicts have
raised urgent questions about the extent to which awards are
bound by a system of precedent, and, more broadly, whether
102

AMINZ Arbitration Appeals Tribunal, supra note 14.
See id. (describing the establishment of the tribunal).
104
Cheng, supra note 40, at 1014–15.
105
For an explanation of the ICSID’s confidentiality rules, see Alexis C. Brown,
Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality Obligation in International
Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 969, 995–96 (2001) (stating the ICSID
Arbitration Rules provide for the privacy of the proceedings and a duty of confidentiality on
the tribunal).
106
ICSID Convention, supra note 29, Rule 48(4).
107
Search Online Decisions and Awards, ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=OnlineAward (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
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international investment law is stable and predictable.
International arbitrators have acknowledged that these issues
may influence both the actual legitimacy and the public’s
perceptions of legitimacy of investment treaty arbitral awards,
and . . . international investment law itself.108
While this point need not be belabored, it is worthy of note because the
ICSID arbitral appellate body, unlike the AMINZ appellate tribunals, would
be issuing decisions that will help to clarify points of international
investment law rather than preserving arbitral appeals from the public sphere.
This benefit cannot be gained without maintaining at least the minimal level
of disclosure that the ICSID currently mandates of all of the matters it
handles.
Consequently, while the AMINZ appellate mechanism is
informative regarding how an appellate structure can successfully operate at
the ICSID, its rules regarding confidentiality will inevitably be somewhat at
odds with those of the ICSID.
B. The Impact of the New Appellate Mechanism upon the Annulment
Process
Another important consideration is whether the new appellate mechanism
will need to replace the current annulment process, and if so, whether it
would need to do so in whole or in part. This Note argues that while the
current annulment mechanism could be replaced by the appellate structure, it
should not be. Instead, the appellate body should be permitted to operate
parallel to the annulment committees, with parties having the option to
choose between the two mechanisms, either prior to arbitration proceedings
or after they have begun.
The AMINZ reform is instructive on this point. The AMINZ appellate
structure is an alternative to appealing to the New Zealand High Court109
rather than as a replacement of the public appeals option. In much the same
way, the current annulment mechanism could remain intact at the ICSID
when the new appellate body is added.110 This Note argues that this structure
should be maintained for several reasons.
108

Cheng, supra note 40, at 1015–16.
Arbitration Appeals Tribunal, supra note 70.
110
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the issues of judicialization in
arbitration that a new appellate body creates, it should not be ignored entirely. Judicialization
is often perceived as a negative development in arbitration because one of the original goals of
arbitration is to avoid some of the aspects of judicialization, such as the impact prior awards
have on the future actions of governmental and private entities. Briefly addressed, this is not
the case either at the AMINZ or at the ICSID. First, the original AMINZ process already
provided for introducing cases into the public judicial system. Thus, by allowing confidential
109
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First, the annulment mechanism generally allows for a speedier resolution
of conflicts than an appellate mechanism allowing for appeals based on legal
issues. Indeed, finality is a reason that substantive review of awards has not
to date been permitted at the ICSID111 and is the key reason such review is
not available.112 Many investors are attracted to the current ICSID
arbitration process in part because of its high degree of finality.113 Despite
the inconsistencies the current annulment process permits to exist at the
original award stage and the further ambiguities it creates within annulment
holdings themselves, there is no reason to believe that every party would
favor accuracy over finality. Indeed, the reason that the annulment process
still exists today, rather than an option for substantive review of awards, is
due at least in part to the desire of some parties to have such a system
available. If this were not the case, and all parties disapproved of the
annulment process, reforms addressing the topic at issue would have been
implemented long ago. Not every party will desire accuracy over finality
now or at any time during the future, and this Note does not posit that they
will.114 Consequently, should the ICSID institute reforms, it must strive to
maintain as much as possible those aspects of its current process that make it
attractive to various parties. To do so would retain its broad appeal to
investors and states alike and preserve, if not increase, its share of
international investment arbitrations.
Allowing parties to choose which mechanism will be available to them
after the initial award is rendered has several advantages. First, parties that
prefer the finality that the annulment process provides will be able to
maintain the status quo by settling their disputes at the ICSID rather than
seeking out an alternative forum. Parties valuing the accuracy of the legal
reasoning of awards, however, will be permitted to appeal awards on legal
grounds through the new ICSID appellate mechanism.

appeals within the AMINZ, this aspect of judicialization was actually reduced. At the ICSID,
the proposed reform would actually increase judicialization, but for various reasons
established in earlier research and reasserted in this Note, this change is actually a positive
development in international investment law. For a more complete analysis of the
judicialization of the ICSID and its effects, see generally Kim, supra note 11, at 252–58
(arguing that to enhance its legitimacy, the ICSID needs to be able to place a check on
inconsistent awards made at the tribunal level).
111
Walsh, supra note 42, at 444–45.
112
Id. at 444.
113
Id.
114
While some parties may prefer the current level of finality over increased certainty and
therefore would not choose the appellate option, this does not preclude a desire to benefit from
the increased certainty that precedent from appellate tribunals would create even at the
original arbitral stage. Indeed, as is discussed further below, the effects of precedent from an
appellate body will likely be felt even by parties that choose not to allow the substance of their
awards to be appealed.
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This approach is beneficial because implementing the new appellate
mechanism in this manner will not only present the parties with the
advantage of choice, but also allow the precedential effect of the new
appellate body to take hold despite maintaining the annulment process. As
the appellate body begins issuing rulings on substantive appeals, all parties
will have the advantage of increased certainty that precedent provides.
While this does not guarantee that awards subject to the annulment
mechanism will be accurate, as errors in tribunals’ legal reasoning will still
not be appealable for parties using this procedure, it will increase the chance
that the original tribunals will apply legal principles correctly. Greater
accuracy during the original arbitration will be facilitated by the emergence
of a single body of precedent from the appellate tribunal. Consequently, all
parties will benefit from the increased certainty of these reforms whether or
not they choose to directly engage the substantive appeal option.
The introduction of choice raises another important issue in this process,
namely, which mechanism will be the default in instances where the parties
cannot agree. If the parties cannot reach an agreement and one party is
absolutely opposed to the default option, the ICSID’s dominant position in
international investment arbitration may be jeopardized as parties consider
other forums in which to settle their disputes. For reasons to be elaborated
upon below, however, this concern is almost certainly unjustified.
The AMINZ structure is once again instructive on this point. At least
initially, the annulment mechanism should be retained as the default option
at the ICSID because it maintains the status quo. The AMINZ reform is
informative because retaining the status quo as the default option permits
parties to retain a higher degree of certainty with respect to what review
mechanism will be available to them. Prior to the reform, parties knew that
by agreeing to arbitration at the AMINZ their awards might be subject to
appeal to the High Court where the arbitration proceedings would be
disclosed. While confidentiality is not an issue on this point in ICSID
proceedings, the underlying reasoning is identical: when investors and states
initially consented to resolve their disputes at the ICSID, they understood
their awards would be subject to the annulment mechanism. Although the
comparative benefits of the substantive appellate option over the annulment
mechanism can be touted as a reason to make the new appeals option the
default, this idea was not part of the parties’ initial reasoning. When consent
to ICSID jurisdiction was originally given,115 parties could not have foreseen
that they would be subject to a substantive appeals process. Consequently,
without the consent of all parties to a dispute, they should not be forced to

115

Assuming consent was given prior to the reforms proposed in this Note.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE APPEAL OF ICSID AWARDS

8/21/2013 2:42 PM

587

subject themselves to the new appellate body when they originally agreed to
the annulment process by engaging in arbitration at the ICSID.
The AMINZ model should be applied by the ICSID in reforming its
process in this regard. First, keeping the current annulment mechanism in
place allows the ICSID to maintain its support base that prefers that
procedural element, while simultaneously allowing for these parties to
benefit from the increased certainty that precedent established by the new
appellate body provides. Second, allowing the annulment mechanism to
remain the default review procedure affirms the parties’ original
expectations. It also adds the benefit of predictability from new precedent
and provides the parties with the option of agreeing to have awards issued in
their disputes subject to substantive review.
C. Issues Subject to Appeal
As discussed in Part IV, the right to appeal to an AAT at the AMINZ is
limited to questions of law. Appeals based on the absence or insufficiency of
evidence and interpretations or inferences based on these facts are
impermissible. An ICSID appellate body should adopt this rule, with one
important caveat regarding the current grounds for annulment.
Before discussing this modification, the reasons for permitting appeals of
questions of law, while prohibiting appeals based on questions of fact, bears
repeating. Doing so is important to justify total prohibition of review of
evidence and facts where an argument for such appeals could be made. An
argument in favor of allowing evidentiary and factual issues to be appealed
could be asserted on the basis that if parties agree to have their disputes be
subject to appeal on these issues, they should be free to do so. The new
ICSID appellate mechanism should emulate the AMINZ process by not
allowing appeal over a free range of issues subject solely to the limit of the
parties’ consent for the following reasons.
Foremost, some measure of finality should be maintained in the awards of
arbitral tribunals. If every issue of fact becomes subject to appeal, then
awards by the original tribunal run the risk of becoming meaningless and
superfluous.116 To become a credible system of appeal, review must be
limited to legal issues.
Because the appellate body will hear appeals only where all the factual
issues and inferences have already been determined, all parties and the
appellate tribunal will have a degree of certainty regarding the factual record.
Another benefit from permitting appeals only on questions of law is that the
116
While this would certainly not be a universal occurrence, the possibility that this could
occur would jeopardize the strong reputation of the ICSID’s dispute resolution mechanism, as
it would for any judicial or arbitral system.
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new appellate body will provide for flexibility, accuracy, and certainty that
do not currently exist at the ICSID, while also keeping the grounds for
appeal within respectable limits. Further, limiting appeals to questions of
law avoids jeopardizing the current strengths that make arbitration at the
ICSID so attractive to investors and states alike.
There is, however, one important caveat to an appellate mechanism that
arises under the ICSID framework and not under the AMINZ procedure:
whether issues that are currently subject to annulment should be issues that
can be later appealed to an appellate tribunal. The five grounds for
annulment should be separate grounds for appeal to the appellate tribunals
apart from questions of law.117 There are two reasons this policy should be
enacted.
First, allowing appeal of the five grounds for annulment does not extend
the issues for appeal to evidentiary and factual questions. Instead, the
grounds for annulment are much more specific. While they do not extend to
questions of law, they serve an important purpose in protecting parties from
awards where there were serious problems with the tribunal, such as it was
not properly formed, exceeded its authority, or one of its members was
corrupt.118 The last two grounds—there was a serious and fundamental
procedural error or the award does not contain a statement of the reasoning
upon which it is based—are also equally serious problems.
Next, in order to maintain parties’ basic expectations, both at the ICSID
and for dispute resolution in general, such serious flaws must be able to be
addressed by any appellate or annulment mechanism. Because parties will
have the ability to opt out of the annulment mechanism and into the new
appellate system, it would be inappropriate and damaging to the reputation of
the ICSID process if new appellate tribunals could not reverse an award for
one of the five reasons for which they can currently be annulled. The
AMINZ procedure is not instructive on this point because its new appellate
mechanism actually mirrors the prior process at the AMINZ, where the
appellate tribunal is given the same authority as that of the High Court in
handling an appeal.119 Because of this fundamental difference, the new
ICSID appellate body should have explicit authority to hear all appeals based
on the grounds for annulment where the parties have agreed to a right to
appeal.120
117

See supra note 29 and accompanying text (referencing the ICSID Convention).
AMINZ Appeal Rules, supra note 63, art. 52.
119
Id. art. 12.1.
120
The issue of precedent involving issues appealed based on the five grounds for
annulment need not be dwelled upon at great length here, but it is worth mentioning. As
discussed in Part II above, the annulment committees have actually added an additional layer
of inconsistency to ICSID awards. Thus, the fact that the appellate tribunals can review
awards on these grounds, although not on appeal from the annulment committees themselves
118
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D. Structuring the New Appellate Mechanism
The next issue in ICSID appellate reform, which is the actual structure of
the mechanism itself, is fundamental to the long-term success of the ICSID
appellate system. The AMINZ mechanism provides guidance on many of
the issues that arise in this area.
As discussed in Part IV, the AMINZ reforms created three new bodies to
carry out the appellate process: the AAC, the AAP, and the AATs. This
structure is useful for several reasons, and should be implemented by the
ICSID with certain limited modifications.
The AAC can be easily replicated at the ICSID. The members of the
AAC would be appointed by the Secretariat, which is already responsible for
“providing institutional support for . . . ICSID proceedings,” assisting in
establishing commissions, tribunals, and committees, and administering the
proceedings of cases.121 The exact number of members of the AAC need not
be limited to three. In the interest of both representing the interests of the
ICSID’s various member states while concurrently not making the AAC too
large and cumbersome, a body comprised of a minimum of five members
and not too many more would seem to be an appropriate solution.
The AAC would be primarily responsible for establishing the AATs for
each case on an ad hoc basis. Allowing the AAC to appoint the AATs, rather
than the Secretariat, will help foster confidence in the new mechanism
because it will be transparent, a smaller body than the Secretariat, and solely
responsible for dealing with arbitral appeals. Establishing an independent
AAC to administer appellate proceedings will avoid the possibility of the
Secretariat becoming overburdened, and allowing the Secretariat to appoint
the individual members of the AAC will ensure that it still maintains a role in
the administration of appellate proceedings. As at the AMINZ, members of
the ICSID AAC should be appointed for a renewable term of three years.
This provides for stability in leadership at the AAC while also allowing the
organization to be flexible by replacing members as they, or the Secretariat,
deem necessary.
The next institutional body that would need to be established is an AAP
where appellate level arbitrators would be pooled. This group of arbitrators
as the two mechanisms are mutually exclusive, will almost certainly help foster consistency
on these issues. Additionally, it is arguable that the inconsistency at the annulment stage is
caused at least in part by the uncertainty annulment committees have regarding the extent of
their authority. Due to its clear position as an appellate body with the ability to rule on legal
issues, this factor would not be present in the new appellate mechanism, with the consequence
that overall certainty would be increased in the process.
121
Organizational Structure of ICSID, ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServle
t?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=RightFrame&FromPage=Organization%20and%20Struc
ture&pageName=Organization (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
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would ideally be specialists and professionals in international investment
arbitration who would be willing to make a long-term availability
commitment to hear appeals at the ICSID.
The value of having a permanent pool of arbitrators is even more
important at the ICSID than at the AMINZ because of the precedential effect
the decisions by the AATs will have. By creating a consistent group of
appellate tribunal members who will be available to serve on several
appellate tribunals over time, consistency can be more easily established,
which will help to foster certainty. As a measure of comparison, if there
were no AAP, and appellate arbitrators were instead selected on an entirely
independent basis, consistency in decision-making would likely be
jeopardized. By having a permanent pool of arbitrators where members
enter and exit the organization slowly, consistency can be promoted at both
the micro and macro levels. At the level of the individual appeal, parties will
know who the possible tribunal members will be, while the system as a
whole will benefit from having a limited group of experts in the field making
appellate level decisions about international investment law. This structure
will help strengthen the system as a whole while maintaining the flexibility
of being able to slowly integrate new members into the AAP.
Under the AMINZ procedure, arbitrators apply to the AMINZ Council,
and not to the AAC, for admission to the AAP.122 This procedure can be
easily replicated at the ICSID by allowing the Secretariat to determine who
will be admitted to the AAP. Allowing the Secretariat rather than the AAC
to make these decisions is important for a few reasons.
First, the fact that the AAC appoints members of the AAP to the
individual AATs provides a strong case for a separate decision-maker
determining who should serve on the AAP. The AAC’s role at the AMINZ
is to administer the appellate proceedings, not to organize the mechanism
itself. This role falls to the AMINZ Council. Similarly, while the ICSID
Secretariat will not be responsible for the day-to-day appellate procedure, the
primary responsibility for organizing the ICSID appellate mechanism would
rest with it. Consequently, the AMINZ appellate procedure is quite
instructive on this point and can be replicated at the ICSID.
Second, having the Secretariat determine admission to the AAP will
provide an additional layer of review when it comes to the composition of
the AATs. Rather than having the AAP and AATs chosen by the same group
of people, it is beneficial and more legitimate to have separate groups of
people involved in selecting who will be on the AAP and who will hear a
specific appeal on an AAT.
122

Admission Criteria, AMINZ, http://www.aminz.org.nz/Category?Action=View&Catego
ry_id=435 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
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The third reason for allowing the Secretariat to appoint individuals to the
AAP is that the Secretariat is a permanent body of non-rotating members,
while members of the AAC are in a more temporary position. Because
members of the AAP are subject to a renewal of their term every few years,
allowing permanent members of the Secretariat to determine who occupies
these positions is a better option than allowing members of the AAC, who
are also subject to renewal by the Secretariat. This procedure will help to
maintain greater uniformity in the nomination process, as there is generally
less turnover among members of the Secretariat than of the AAC.
In short, it is the role of the Secretariat to organize the appellate structure
at its most general level. The AAC, which is composed of temporary
members responsible for the administration of individual appeals, operates
the system established by the Secretariat on a day-to-day and case-by-case
basis.
Consequently, the current ICSID structure lends itself to
organizational reform using the AMINZ structure as a model.
The AMINZ procedure for establishment of individual AATs by the AAC
can also be replicated at the ICSID. While the role of the AAC in appointing
individual members to the AATs has been discussed above, discussion of the
constitution and role of the individual AAT in the appellate procedure lends
itself best to analysis with the next issue: the new appellate procedure.
E. Appellate Procedure at the ICSID
The last issue that arises in considering a new appellate mechanism at the
ICSID is its actual procedure. While not all procedural elements are called
into issue in this analysis, some must be addressed because they are crucial
to the successful operation of the ICSID appellate process. Many of these
elements relate to and develop from the foregoing analysis, and once again
the AMINZ appellate procedure successfully maps onto and guides the
development of the proposed ICSID appellate mechanism.
In determining the appellate arbitrators for the AATs, the AMINZ AAC is
allowed to consider the input of the individual parties.123 The AAC
ultimately makes all determinations regarding the composition of the
AAT,124 although it may also consider the wishes of the parties.125 This
procedure can be replicated at the ICSID and is important so that the ICSID
itself, through the AAC, will be able to determine the members of the
tribunal and how many members will hear the appeal. Selection of AAT
arbitrators by the ACC will help the ICSID maintain tighter control over the
appellate process than it does over the original arbitral tribunals. This
123
124
125

AMINZ Appeal Rules, supra note 63, art. 5.1(a)(i).
Id. art. 6.1.
Id. art. 6.2.
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control is important because the appellate tribunals will often be involved in
clarifying difficult legal issues and even rectifying different approaches taken
by earlier arbitral tribunals that are in conflict with one another. Allowing
the ICSID AAC to ultimately determine the composition of the individual
tribunals will ensure that none of its members are picked by one of the
parties solely on self-serving grounds. While selection of arbitrators by the
parties is allowed and indeed important for the constitution of the original
tribunal because parties often attempt to appoint arbitrators who they believe
will sympathize with their case, appeals are designed to address legal
mistakes of those tribunals and will have further reaching precedential
effects. Consequently, the appellate tribunals should not be appointed by the
parties themselves, but should be chosen by the AAC because the ACC is
more concerned with the integrity of the system as a whole than on the
wishes of the parties to the appeal.
Another procedural rule that is important for the ICSID to adopt from the
AMINZ appellate process is the requirement that the AATs state the
reasoning for their awards. This is important at the ICSID not only to help
further clarify and settle the matter between the parties themselves, but also
as a procedural element for the appellate mechanism to foster consistency
and certainty for parties in the future regarding the status of international
investment law. Indeed, it is crucial that the ICSID adopt this procedural
mechanism. Even where the parties may agree to keep their arbitration
confidential, the ICSID can still continue to state the basic reasoning in its
regular publications as it already does under confidential annulment
proceedings.
A final procedural element that is important to carry over from the
AMINZ appellate tribunals is the power of the ICSID AATs to have full
review of the award including the ability to remand the award to the original
tribunal, unless that tribunal is either unwilling or unable to conduct the
remand. This is a useful procedure at the AMINZ that allows the AATs to
review awards within their sphere of legal review while also allowing them
to remand the case to allow the original tribunal to rule on issues that are its
responsibility to determine. Importantly, the AMINZ rules also provide that
if the original tribunal cannot be reconstituted, the AAT may rule on the
issue itself if it wishes. Allowing the ICSID AATs to do this would
strengthen its new mechanism by preventing cases from being delayed where
the original tribunal is not available to rule on an issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ICSID is currently at an important juncture in its development as the
leading forum for the arbitration of international investment disputes. The
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past decade has seen a tremendous growth in applications to arbitrate
disputes at the ICSID, which is in large part due to the institution’s many
strengths. In the process, however, some underlying problems have become
increasingly exposed, most notably the continuing use of the unreformed
annulment mechanism. The field of international investment arbitration is
subject to an increasing number of disputes that often address important and
unsettled issues of investment law. The ICSID however, has not yet
developed a way to resolve inconsistencies caused by divergent decisions
among tribunals on certain legal issues, nor developed a way to correct a
legal error in any single case. Early on in the institution’s life, consistency
seemed to be a sacrifice worth making in exchange for finality. Nonetheless,
as inconsistent decisions become more problematic with the growth of the
field of international investment it has become apparent that the ICSID can
no longer ignore the need for consistency, certainty, and predictability in
international investment law if it is to continue to lead as the primary dispute
resolution institution. While the present annulment mechanism need not be
eliminated, it should not remain the sole process available for the review of
arbitral awards.
Several alternatives have been presented to solve this current problem in
international investment law. For various reasons discussed in Part II above,
these proposals are either unfeasible or would not adequately address the
issues. By analogizing to a new arbitral appellate mechanism used in
commercial arbitration (the AMINZ), this Note has provided insight into
how a more conventional appellate mechanism might function at the ICSID
and what points of consideration are necessary when instituting such
reforms. The time has come for the ICSID and its signatory members to
begin to confront these issues and, in so doing, develop a new procedure that
will be able to address the complex and unsettled issues of international
investment law in the twenty-first century.

